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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Olaf Hanson challenged the district court's denial of two motions: a motion for a
continuance to obtain alternate counsel and a subsequent motion to "remove" his counsel. He
argued the district court abused its discretion by denying these motions because, for the
continuance motion, the district court did not weigh the relevant factors and, for the removal
motion, the district court did not conduct any inquiry with Mr. Hanson into the conflict with his
current counsel. In light of these errors, Mr. Hanson respectfully requests this Court vacate his
judgment of conviction and either remand his case for a new trial or an adequate inquiry into his
conflicts with counsel.
The State responded and disputed these discretionary errors by the district court. This
Reply Brief is necessary to address some of the arguments raised by the State. For the State's
arguments not addressed here, Mr. Hanson respectfully refers this Court to his Appellant's Brief

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Hanson's Appellant's Brief articulated the facts and proceedings. (App. Br., pp.1-3.)
They are not repeated here, but are incorporated by reference.

1

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Mr. Hanson's motion for a continuance and
motion for counsel to withdraw?

2

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying Mr. Hanson's Motion For A Continuance
And Motion For Counsel To Withdraw
This Reply Brief is necessary to respond to one of the State's arguments on Mr. Hanson's
challenge to the district court's denial of his motion for a continuance and a handful of
arguments on Mr. Hanson's challenge to the district court's denial of his motion to remove
counsel.

1.

Motion for a Continuance

While Mr. Hanson and the State agree on the seven factors to consider for a continuance
motion to seek new counsel, Mr. Hanson and the State disagree on the application of those
factors to this case. (App. Br., pp.7-10; Resp. Br., pp.6-13.) The State's analysis of the factors is
unremarkable except as to factor seven: qualifications of counsel.
The State is correct that the seventh factor considers "the qualifications possessed by
present counsel." State v. Rockstahl, 159 Idaho 364, 369 (Ct. App. 2015) (emphasis added)

(quoting State v. Carman, 114 Idaho 791, 793 (1988)). (Resp. Br., pp.12-13.) The State is also
correct that Mr. Hanson discussed the qualifications of substitute counsel. (Resp. Br., p.13; App.
Br., p.9.) This alleged misstep, however, is attributable to the Rockstahl decision. In that case,
the Court of Appeals' discussion of this factor referenced substitute counsel's qualifications:
"Finally, the last factor analyzes the qualifications possessed by present counsel. As the district
court discussed, substitute counsel had the requisite qualifications to appear on Rockstahl' s
behalf and was ready and willing to represent Rockstahl." Rockstahl, 159 Idaho at 370 (emphasis
added). Then, in a footnote, the Court of Appeals quoted the lower court's review of this factor,
but referenced the qualifications of "current counsel." Id. at 370 n.4. It is not clear whether
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"current counsel" meant present counsel or substitute counsel because the defendant in Rockstahl
eventually had substitute counsel represent him in the lower court. Id. at 367. Thus, Rockstahl
indicates this factor weighs the qualifications of both present and substitute counsel. Mr. Hanson
therefore submits he did not intend to "duck" the factor by discussing substitute counsel. (See
Resp. Br., p.13.)
In any event, this factor remains neutral. In examining this factor in State v. Pratt, 125
Idaho 546 (1993), the Court identified that "there was no discussion of the public defender's
qualifications." Id. at 556. The Court did not hold the lack of information against the defendant.
Id. In fact, the Court held the lower court should have granted the defendant's motion for a

continuance. Id. The Court so held despite the sparse record:
The record shows that the motion came on the first day of what eventually
became a four-day preliminary hearing. The court noted it had not been made
aware of any efforts on Pratt's behalf to secure private counsel until this day.
Further, the court noted that it had gone through "administrative gymnastics" to
schedule the hearing. The requested length of the delay was two weeks. In
addition, there was no evidence that Pratt was attempting to manipulate the
proceedings; he had not previously requested a continuance, and there were no
findings regarding inconvenience to witnesses or prejudice to the prosecution.
Finally, the record is devoid of any specific "irreconcilable conflict" between
Pratt and his public defender, and there was no discussion of the public defender's
qualifications.
From the record, it is clear that the magistrate should have granted Pratt's
motion for a continuance.
Id. at 555-56. (Because the defendant moved for a continuance to have substitute counsel at the

preliminary hearing, and the defendant received a fair trial, the Court essentially held the error
was harmless. Id. at 556.) Here, there was no information about substitute counsel, and the
district court did not review present counsel's qualifications. The State speculates present
counsel was "qualified" because "he was a practicing member of the Idaho State Bar with an
augustly low bar-number to boot." (Resp. Br., p.12.) But the fact that Mr. Hanson's counsel was
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a practicing member of the Bar says nothing about his qualifications. If that were the only fact to
consider, then this factor is meaningless because, obviously, an attorney must be admitted by the
Bar to practice law. The same goes for a bar-number. A bar-number says nothing about counsel's
area of expertise, number of trials, or time spent actually practicing law. Finally, the State points
to present counsel's experience trying "at least one felony drug case before"-Mr. Hanson's
other case previously consolidated with this one. (Resp. Br., p.12.) The State fails to mention,
however, that Mr. Hanson wanted his counsel to withdraw in that case as well, and the district
court denied that motion. (See R., p.81.) Ultimately, the facts relied on by the State to assert
Mr. Hanson's counsel was "undoubtedly qualified" do not show as much. The record was silent
on the qualifications of present counsel and substitute counsel, and Mr. Hanson maintains the
silence on the record is primarily the result of the district court's failure to consider the seven
factors. (App. Br., p.8; see generally Tr. Vol. I, p.3, L.3-p.5, L.24.) The qualification factor is
neutral and does not weigh against denying Mr. Hanson's motion.

2.

Motion to Remove Counsel

With respect to Mr. Hanson's prose motion to remove his counsel, the State contends the
district court had no obligation to inquire with Mr. Hanson because there was insufficient
evidence to show the district court was aware of the motion or its contents. (Resp. Br., p.15.) The
State's argument is contrary to the record and the law. First, the district court was aware of the
motion because Mr. Hanson filed it in the district court. (R., p.195 (file-stamped by Kootenai
County district court clerk).) "[T]he [motion] was before the district court and this Court applies
a presumption of regularity and validity to judgments." State v. Wolfe, 158 Idaho 55, 61 (2015)
(citing cases). The Court presumes the district court denies a motion when it expressly fails to
rule on it. Id. This presumption necessarily means the district court is aware of the motion before
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it denies it. Contrary to these presumptions, the State asks this Court to presume the district court
is unaware of the filings in its docket. This request serves to abrogate the long-standing
presumption of regularity afforded to the district court's actions. Mr. Hanson submits this Court
should reject the State's argument to assume the district court had no knowledge of a filed
motion in a pending case.
Second, the State asks this Court to impose an additional, unnecessary burden on pro se
defendants to inform the district court of a desire for substitute counsel. The State argues
Mr. Hanson's motion did not make the district court "aware of the problems" in the first place.
(Resp. Br., p.15.) In support of this new requirement, the State quotes State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho
586 (Ct. App. 2007) (Lippert I): "The trial court must afford the defendant a full and fair

opportunity to present the facts and reasons in support of a motion for substitution of counsel
after having been made aware of the problems involved." Id. at 594 (second emphasis added).
The State maintains this "having been made aware" language requires something more than
Mr. Hanson's motion in this case. Mr. Hanson's motion was more than sufficient to inform the
district court of his request. Mr. Hanson stated, in relevant part, "I have the right to adequate
counsel, R.D. Watson, best interest is to get a plea bargain and not take my case to trial, he
doesn't answer my calls. He doesn't come talk to me about my case, I ask you very respectfully
to remove R.D. Watson from my case." (R., p.195 (sic).) Mr. Hanson's request was clear. He
wanted Mr. Watson removed from his case because there was a communication breakdown and,
perhaps more importantly, Mr. Watson was not acting in accordance with Mr. Hanson's
objective ofrepresentation (to plead guilty rather than go to trial). See, e.g., McCoy v. Louisiana,
138 S. Ct. 1500, 1508 (2018) (identifying certain decisions, such as "whether to plead guilty," as
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"reserved for the client," not the attorney). Mr. Hanson's motion was adequate to trigger the
district court's duty to inquire.
Similarly, the State's new requirement turns the district court's duty to inquire on its
head. For better or worse, the duty to inquire rule places an obligation on the district court to
conduct an inquiry with the defendant. State v. Bias, 157 Idaho 895, 897 (Ct. App. 2014) ("Both
the Idaho Court of Appeals and the Idaho Supreme Court have held that a trial court is obligated
to apply certain procedures when a person seeks substitute counsel."). The State now suggests
the defendant must inform the district court of the problems with counsel before the district court
is obligated to inquire about those problems. This defeats the purpose of the district court's
inquiry. Because "[t]he defendant's right to an inquiry flows from several interrelated
constitutional guarantees," the district court must "gather[ ] the facts required to adjudicate the
motion" and ensure the protection of these constitutional rights. Id. at 898.
Further, the "after having been made aware" language does not impose additional
requirements on the defendant, but frames the scope of the district court's inquiry. The Bias
Court recognized the district court's "duty to inquire is fact-dependent." 157 Idaho at 898. For
example, the district court was under no obligation to conduct a more detailed inquiry upon
learning of the defendant's "subjective opinion" that his counsel had no "desire" to be
"competent" in his case. State v. Clayton, 100 Idaho 896, 897-88 (1980). Similarly,
a more limited duty to inquire is imposed when a defendant "at best hinted that he
was dissatisfied with [his attorney's] performance on only one occasion" and took
"no initiative to request substitute counsel." State v. Grant, 154 Idaho 281, 285
(2013). Under those facts, it is sufficient to ask a defendant if he has any
questions, and move on if he fails to raise any complaints about counsel. Id. at
285-86.
Bias, 157 Idaho at 898 (alteration in original). On the other hand, if the defendant makes the

district court aware of wanting "to fire counsel" or "that counsel had spent only thirty minutes
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with him preparing for trial and did not even inform him that the date for trial had been
rescheduled," the district court is "obligated to make some reasonable inquiry and assessment
into the validity of [the defendant's] concerns." Lippert I, 145 Idaho at 594. Therefore, the
language seized upon by the State does not impose a duty of specificity on the defendant. It
simply recognizes the scope of district court's inquiry depends on "the problems involved."
Finally, Mr. Hanson submits the State's reliance on State v. Meyers, 164 Idaho 620
(2019), is misplaced. Meyers examined whether the defendant abandoned his request to represent
himself. Id. at 624. "[T]he Sixth Amendment right to self-representation [must] be invoked
unequivocally," and "the defendant's subsequent conduct must also indicate a continuing
intention to proceed pro se." Id. (citation omitted). A defendant can waive his request "if it
reasonably appears to the court that defendant has abandoned his initial request to represent
himself." Id. (quoting Brown v. Wainwright, 665 F.2d 607, 611 (5th Cir. 1982)). Yet no Idaho
cases reviewing a defendant's request for substitute counsel have considered whether the
defendant waived that request through conduct, such as continuing with the proceedings. See
Grant, 154 Idaho at 285-86; State v. Nath, 137 Idaho 712, 714-15 (2002); Clayton, 100 Idaho at

897-98; Bias, 157 Idaho at 897-98; State v. Lippert, 152 Idaho 884, 886-89 (Ct. App. 2012)
(Lippert II); State v. Gamble, 146 Idaho 331, 335-36 (Ct. App. 2008); Lippert I, 145 Idaho at

518-23; State v. Peck, 130 Idaho 711, 712-14 (Ct. App. 1997). The reason for this waiver
distinction between a request for self-representation and a request for substitute counsel stems
from the different constitutional rights at stake. Although the Sixth Amendment implicitly
guarantees the right to proceed prose, Meyers, 164 Idaho at 623, that right is not unlimited. For
example, "the trial court is not constitutionally required to inform a defendant of the right to selfrepresentation when a defendant merely expresses dissatisfaction with current counsel." Lippert
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I, 145 Idaho at 594. A request for substitute counsel, however, invokes more than the implicit

right to proceed pro se. Bias, 157 Idaho at 898 ("The right to an inquiry also flows from a
defendant's constitutional right to refuse counsel and proceed pro se."). The defendant's right to
an inquiry also guarantees the protection of the explicit Sixth Amendment "right to effective
assistance of counsel, provided at state expense for the indigent." Bias, 157 Idaho at 898. And it
flows from procedural due process rights as well. Id. These different constitutional protections
explain why the defendant's mere acquiescence or consent to continuing with the proceedings
does not amount to waiver of these rights. Similarly, if the district court inquires and finds good
cause (such as "an actual conflict of interest; a complete, irrevocable breakdown of
communication; or an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict"), "the
defendant is constitutionally entitled to the appointment of new counsel." Lippert I, 145 Idaho at
594. A defendant cannot silently, through conduct, waive a conflict that deprives him of effective
assistance of counsel. In light of these distinct rights at play, the Meyers Court's examination of
the defendant's waiver of his pro se request has no bearing on Mr. Hanson's request to remove
his attorney for failing to communicate with him and ignoring his objective of representation.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Hanson respectfully requests this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and
remand his case for a new trial. In the alternative, he respectfully requests this Court remand his
case for an adequate inquiry to determine good cause for substitute counsel.
DATED this 14th day of May, 2019.

/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
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/s/ Evan A. Smith
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Administrative Assistant
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